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Abstract: Although it is an empirical regularity that in the trading of homogeneous goods 
there are persistent price dispersion and competition between sellers, it is theoretically derived 
that when buyers are optimisers, in market equilibrium, there are neither price dispersion nor 
competition (the Diamond’s paradox). This undesirable theoretical result induces the growth 
of doubt in the relevance of using optimisation in the study of human behaviour (the Hey’s 
critique). In this work I demonstrate that it is not necessary to abandon the optimisation 
framework to overturn this pitfall if assumed that economic agents have computational 
restrictions. That is, I demonstrate that when optimiser buyers have search and computational 
costs in market equilibrium there is price dispersion, search and competition between sellers. 
JEL codes: D43, D83 
Keywords: Search, Computational costs, Optimisation, Market equilibrium 
 
1. Introduction 
Dating back to Stigler (1961) there is in the economic literature an effort to justify the 
occurrence of persistent price dispersion on trade of homogeneous goods. This has been 
related to the fact that economic agents do not have perfect knowledge (e.g., Lippman and 
McCall, 1976). 
However, within a theoretical framework where buyers are homogeneous and intend to 
acquire one product whose price is unknown, it results in a market equilibrium where there is 
neither price dispersion nor search. This result is valid either when buyers follow the optimal 
sequential sample strategy (Diamond, 1971) or the sub-optimal fixed sample size strategy 
(Vieira, 2004). 
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This undesirable theoretical result induces the growth of doubt in the relevance of using 
optimisation in the study of human behaviour. Hey (1981) ads to this result the conjecture that 
economic agents are unable to use optimal rules because it would be necessary an enormous 
computation effort. Nonetheless, in a search framework, economic agents payoffs are higher 
when they use a sub-optimal rule. But, in my opinion, if one wants economics science to 
overpass the metaphysical stage of just looking for a short-range cause-effect prevision being 
also a positive science that looks for the deep regularities of economic agents behaviour, the 
optimisation principle cannot be abandoned.  
In this work I introduce micro-economic level computational limitation on buyers, over-
passing Hey (1981)’s critic without abandoning the optimisation theoretical framework. 
Being that computation has a cost, I assume that buyers calculate the optimal strategy with an 
error component whose size results endogenous to the optimisation process.  
As conclusion, I prove that the existence of both search and computational costs is a sufficient 
condition to the existence in market equilibrium of search, price dispersion and competition.  
 
2. Assumption of the theory 
The theory I build up is based on the next assumptions: 
A1. F(p) is the distribution function of market prices; 
A2. Buyers search sequentially being c the marginal search cost; 
A3. To compute the search optimal reservation price, buyers use computational 
intensity n that costs cc per unit used; 
A4. With more computational intensity, buyers decrease the error e of the 
computation; 
A5. The reduction of the error (an expected measure) is computed as a Monte-Carlo 
algorithm with no variance reduction technique: n/0ee = ; 
A6. The expected expenditure increases with the distance between the optimal 
reservation price and the calculated one, being a linear function; 
A7. Sellers have unlimited computational capacity; 
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A8. In sellers’ perspective, buyers compute a reservation price obtaining as result a 
positive number extracted from the uniform distribution around the optimal reservation price 
P*. Lets assume that [ ]ee +-+ *),*,0max(~ PPUP ; 
 A9. All this assumptions are common knowledge. 
3. Main results 
Lemma 1. The optimal buyers strategy is to compute the reservation price with an error 
component. 
Proof: It is known from the literature (McCall, 1965) that the optimal buyers strategy when 
there is no computation costs implies computing the reservation price P* that corresponds to 
the minimum expected expenditure: 
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When there are computational costs, reservation price is computed with error becoming the 
expected expenditure higher than the minimal value P*. Assumed, with no generality loss, 
that the expected expenditure increases with the error in a linear functional form, it becomes: 
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Buyers minimize expression (2) by using an optimal computational intensity. This optimal 
intensity of computation is:  
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That is a minimum because 
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Although the existence of heterogeneity in the reservation price is considered in the literature 
connected with exogenous buyers’ heterogeneity, (e.g., Axell, 1977) in this work it is for the 
first time associated with computational restrictions. 
Lemma 2. No seller will affix prices out of the domain [max (0, P* – e); P* + e]. 
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Proof: First, a buyer with reservation price P+ will search the good until he/she finds a price 
smaller than or equal to that reservation price. Being so, the probability that the buyer 
acquires the good with a price smaller than or equal to p is (Axell, 1977): 
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Expanding expression (4) to all possible reservation prices, one obtains, in expected 
terms, the market distribution function of the price at which buyers acquire the good: 
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Assuming, without loss, that the number of buyers and sellers are normalised to one, then the 
expected profit function of a seller is the derivative of expression (5) divided by the quantity 
of sellers that affix price p, f(p), and multiplied by p: 
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Simplifying, one obtains: 
[ ]
ï
ï
ï
î
ï
ï
ï
í
ì
+>
+££-
-<
= ò
ò
¥ +
+
¥
-
+
+
**,0
****,
)(
1
**,
)(
1
*2
1
)(
**
e
ee
e
e
p
e
Pp
PpPdP
PF
PpdP
PF
ppE
p
P
      (7) 
It results that the expected profit function (7) is negative if price is negative, increasing with 
price until max(0, P* – e), positive (and constant, see Lemma 3) for all prices affixed in the 
interval [max (0, P* – e); P* – e] and zero elsewhere, so it is not optimal that firms affix 
prices out of the interval [max (0, P* – e); P* – e]. QED  
Lemma 3. The market equilibrium price distribution function has the 
form
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Proof: In order to market be in a Nash equilibrium situation, the expected profit function 
must be horizontal for all prices affixed (in [max (0, P* – e); P* – e] by Lemma 2). Being so, 
from expression (7) and Lemma 2, it results that: 
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Deriving both members, one obtains: 
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Theorem1. Reservation price decreases with the increase in computation costs and the 
decrease in search costs. 
Proof. Sellers compute the reservation price substituting expression (9) in (1).  
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Simplifying this expression one obtains the following implicit function:  
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The properties of the reservation price result from this implicit function. From (11) and (3), it 
is straightforward to see that 0
*
<
dcc
dP
 and 0
*
>
dc
dP
. 
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Fig. 1 – Evolution of the reservation price with search and computational costs 
                     QED 
Corollary 1. When computation costs tend to zero and search cost maintains positive the 
solution approximates the Diamond result (the reservation price tends to the monopoly price 
and price dispersion tends to zero). 
Proof. From expression (3) when computation costs tend to zero, the computation intensity 
increases and the error tends to zero. From Lemma 2, then there is no price dispersion. From 
expressions (11) and (3), the equilibrium price is the monopoly price as 
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4. Conclusion 
In this work I study the influence of computational costs in the behaviour of buyers when they 
search for an unknown price. Specifically, I study whether that individual behaviour changes 
are sufficient to surpass the Diamond (1971)’s paradox. I introduce computational limitations 
on buyers’ side but not, contrary to Hey (1981), without abandoning the optimisation 
theoretical framework. My conclusion is affirmative: when buyers have both search costs and 
computational costs, then, in market equilibrium there is price dispersion, search and 
competition between sellers. 
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Appendix A 
Algebraic steps from expression (10) to (11) 
From expression (10), when P* – e < 0, there will not be a mass point 
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When P* – e ³ 0, there will be a mass point 
2
*
*
23
2
*)(
2)*(
)*(
*
P
dppP
P
c
P
P
P
ò
-
+-+
+
= e
e
e
 Û 
ò
-
+-+
+
=
*
*
23
2
3 2)*(
)*(
*)(
P
P
dppP
P
c
P
e
e
e
 Û  
333
2
3 )*(
3
2
*)(
3
2
)*(
)*(
*)( ee
e
--+-+
+
= PPP
P
c
P  Û 
( )322332 *3*3*3
1
*)(
3
1
)*(
0 eee
e
-+-+-
+
= PPPP
P
c
 Û 
0
)*(3
1
** 2
322 =
+
-+-
e
eee
P
c
PP  
Resulting the expression (11) 
